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Limits to the ownership of domestic resources by nonresidents are common. One example of such limits is those on foreign ownership of farmland. Lapping and Lecko note three main reasons for such ownership restrictions. First, foreign investors may have tax advantages that allow them to outbid local farmers for land. Second, nonresident owners may be more concerned with immediate profitability than good land stewardship. Third, absentee ownership may provide an unstable situation for a leasing farmer and could preclude farm expansion or rationalization of exisling production units. The Farmland Security Act (FSA) was enacted in Saskatchewan in 1974 in an effort to limit foreign ownership of that Jared G. Carlkrg is assistant professol; Department province's agricultural land. T h e FSA severely restricts the amount of land that can be o w n e d by nonresidents of S a s k a t c h e w a n , with Canadian nonresidents limited to 320 acres and forcign nonresidents confined to half that amount. A s such, the law has been cited as a possible cause of depressed provincial farmland values (Reginci Leuclrr-Post) . It is argued that if the number of prospective bidders o n a parcel of farmland is lowered, thc resulting pr-ice received by the vendor will also be lowered. resulting in a decrease in the wealth of farmers.
The ob-jective of the research reported in this paper is to determine the effect of the FSA on Saskatchewan land values. Two methods are used to carry out this objective. First, if the FSA had an effect o n Saskatchewan land prices, this shoulti be reflected in a significant durnmy variable representing the regulatory change. An econometric model that resembles previous models but incorporates the FSA as a permanent fundamental component of the It~nd price time series is constructed to test this hypothesis. A present value (PV) framework,' which calculates land values as the discounted surri of all future payments to the land, is introduced as the null hypothesis. The alternative is an imperfect land market in which the number of bidders affects the final price paid for land. Second, the ratio of the value of land in Saskatchewan to that in the neighboring province of Alberta is compared before and after the Act was implemented. If the FSA had the hypothesized negative effect. then the ratio of the value of Saskatchewan hi-inland to that of Alberta should have decreased after implementation, ceteris paribus.
Though several valuation studies have been carried out for Canadian farmland (Baker, Ketchabaw, and Turvey: Clark. Klein. and Thompson: Veeman, Dong, and Veemnn: Weisensel. Schoney. and Van Kooten) . n o previous study has attempted to model the effects of land ownership restrictions. I f the number of potential nonresident land bidders is a significant proportion of the number of overall potential bidders, then the bid price for land should be lowered as a result of the ownership restriction. Conversely, if the number of potential nonresident land buyers is sufficiently low, no effect upon land values should be observed.
The contribution of the paper is twofcdd. The immediate contribution is to the current policy debate over the need to 1-emove the FSA to protect farm wealth from further decline. If no strong evidence is found that the FSA has caused farmland prices to decrease, then calls for its removal may be without nierit, at least from an ecorio~nic perspective. A longer-term contribution will be to augment the body of literature on land valuation in general, by introducing auclion theory as a fi-arnework for demonstratiny the effects of reduced competition in land markets. The PV model asserts that the price of a parcel of land must be equal to the discounted sum of its f u t~~r e payments. This can be represented by the classic capitalization equatiur~: where RT is the expected value of rent in time period t, with expectations formed in time period (t -l), and F , is the error term. Since the expected values are unknown. a simple rule is used to formulate expectations on the basis of past forecast errors. Specifically. the expected value of the independent variable is formed by taking previous period's expected value and adding to it a constant prop or ti or^ of the difference between last period's expected and realized values. This yields: Equation (2) can be rearranged to show that R I " ( V r -p,, -c,)/P,; a n a l~g o~~s l y , R , * : = (V,-, -p,, -c-, , )/PI. AS such, the lagged value of rent depends on the lagged value of land value, which in turn depends on the lagged value of rent. since expectations are formed in time period (t -I), and so on. It is then necessary to detcrmine the appropriate lag length for land value and rent in the adaptive expectations land value rilodel. 'The tinal form of the model consists of only known values and indicates that:
where i and ,j are the lag lengths on land values and I-ents, respectively.
Saskatchewan farmland is usually sold via one of two auction methods. The first is the familiar oral auction-often called the English auction-in which the auctioneer begins with a given price, then decreases the amount asked ~~n t i l a bid is offered. Once a bid is offered, participants then raise their bids until only one bidder remains. The winning bid is then slightly higher than the sccond-highest biclcler's valuation of the asset. The second and more c o nmon auction n~ethod for Saskatchewan farmland is the first-price sealed bid auction. Irl thi\ type of auclion. b~d s are 5ubmitted to the vendor in secret, with no bidder aware of the ofters made by other bidders. The offers are opened at an appointed date and the highest bidder is awarded the parcel of land at his bid price.
The revenue-equivalence theorem asserts that in a benchmark model, both the English and first-price sealed-bid auctions yield the same price on average (Vickrey).' However, the oral auction requires the presence of the bidders. If it is expensive or inconvenient for bidders to attend the auction, their number may be reduced (Milgrom) , and the winning bid may be lowered sufficiently to more than offset the potential gains from an oral auction. This phenomenon may help explain the prevalence of sealed-bid auctions in the sale of Saskatchewan farmland.
Regardless of the auction method used, it is a well-known empirical result that the winning bid in an auction varies directly with the number of participating bidders (Brannman, Klein, and Weiss; McAfee and McMillan) . This implies that if the numbel-of bidder5 on an asset is restricted by regulation, receipts from the a u c t i o~~ of that asset will decrease, ceteris pcrriD~t.s. Since bidders submit bids that are fur~ctions of their valuations of the itern for sale (McAfee and McMillali), regulatory exclusion of bidders for whom the asset to be auctioned has a higher value than the remaining bidders could lower bids even further. As noted i n the introduction, tax advantages might be an example of a reason a nonresident bidder would assign a higher value to :in asset such as farmland (Lapping and Lecko). T h e use of land for recreational o r other nonl'arnling purposes could be another reason that a nonresident would assign a higher value to a parcel of land than a resident. For example, land used fix a retirement hor~le tilight be valued more highly than a similiu-parcel used strictly for commodity production.
Data
The value of farmland is approximated by the "value of land and buildings" as reported by Statistics Canada's CANSIM service (matrices D202245 258 1.2 and D209241 257 1.2 for Alberta and Saskatchewan, respectively). This is reasonable since the value of a parcel of land certainly includes the value of the huildings located upon it. Since no reliable data exists for cash rents paid in zithel-pt-ovince, "cash receipts from farm products" is used to approximate the rent paid to farmland (CAN-SIM matrices D 2 0 0 2 1 3 27 1 1.2.1 and D200204 270 1.2.1 for Alberta and Saskatchewan, respectively) for the period 1950-1 970, and "total cash receipts" is used for the period 1 97 1 -1999 (CANSIM rr~strices D2 10662 27 1 5 and D210658 270 5 for Alberta and Saskatchewan, respectively).' Veeman. Dong, and Veeman chose total cash receipts to represent returns to farmland in their applicatiorl of the PV model to Canadian farmland. Both the value of farmland and the rent series were con-' Statistics Canada changeti its methoti of reporting cash receipts to Ihrm operators at that time. Since potential bidders on a parcel of land are aware ol. past Ireturns to that land, a change in how those rctul-ns are measurcd by a government agency will not affect their expectations. unless rtccornpanied by a policy change.
Since the change applied to both. the ratio or Saskatcliewrrn lo Alberta rents will also not bc affected.
verted to real price and real rent series by dividing each series by the consumer price index ( 1992 -100) (CANSIM matrix PI00000 9940 I). Data used are for the period 1950-1999. inclusive.
Procedure
Although the effects of Saskatchewan's regulatory change on land prices in that province are the topic of interest in this paper. the pro\,-ince of Alberta is included as a control. Since Alberta does not restrict ownership of farmland by Canadian residents of other provinces,' land values in that province should not have been measurably affected by legislatiorl such as the FSA during the period of study.
P V tnodels of land valuation depend crucially on the hypothesis that land prices and rents are stationary in their respective fir-st-differences (Falk; Clark, Fulton. and Scott) . A Dickey-Fuller test can be used t o determine whether a time series is first-difference stationary. Consider the following rep]-esentation of land values and rents, respectively: Table 1 . T h e results indicate that both the land value and rent time series for Saskatchewan and Alberta are stationary in tirstAlberta, like Saskatchewan, rcstl-ict\ ownership by non-Canadian residents. However, it is assumed that thc number of prospective non-C~in;ldian land buyers is much smaller than the nuinher of prospective Cnnadian land buyers. where land value and rent variables are as previously defined. FSA is the indicator variable representing the change in regulation, and cv,, and rl,,,, are the error terms.
If two separate equations are affected by common factors that influence their disturbances. it may be appropriate to treat the equations as a set rather than separately (Johnson and DiNardo). Pongcanakorn and Tweeten included nurnerou\ tactor5 that exert minor influence on the price of Inntl, and thu5 could affect the d14turbance term\ in the equation\ for land \slues in both Sa4hatchewan and Alberta.' One method for e4tlmation of \uch a set of equations-if there are no dependent regressors-is seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). As the name denotes, the ecluations in a SUR system seen1 to be unrelated but are related through their disturbance tcrnis. By estimating the equations as a set rather than individually, the efficiency of the estimate can be enhanced by taking the cross-equation correlations into account.
Before S U K can be performed, it is necessary to determine whether the error terms of the equations follow any autoregressive proccss. If autocorrelation is present in a model and not addressed, parameter estimates will be inefficient and statistical tests will be biased. Further, thc presence of' autocorrelation in a framework such as the adaptive expectations PV land model, with a lagged dependent variable, causes all desirable estimator properties to be lost. If the residual of a regression ecluation in time period t is given by e,. then testing for first-order ;rutocorrelation involves testing H,,: p = 0 in the equation:
Higher-or-dcr autocorrelation of an analogous form can also exist. Testing for ~lutocorrelation i~sually is done with a Durbin-Watson cl-test, but that method cannot be used in the adaptive expectations PV model because it includes one or more laggccl dependent variables as regressors. Accordingly. the Durbin-/I test is used in this paper; and indicates that autocorrelation exists for residuals in both the Saskatchewan and Alberta equations." Stepwise autoregression is then used to determine the order of the autoregressive ~nodel for the equations. and it is concluded that the equations for both pro\!-; Pongtanakot-n :rnd Twcetrn list factors such as in tercst rates on farm loans, population density. htock ~narket return\. and others. inces follow a first-order autol-egressice error model. The MODEL procedure in S A S allows for the estimation of a SUR system with autocorrelation. and is used to estimate equations 7 and 8 in double-log form, incorporating a firstorder autoregressive error structure. The Shapiro-Wilk W test statistics for Saskatchewan and Alberta are 0.97 and 0.98, respectively, with p-values of 0.46 and 0.83. As such, the null hypothesis of normality is not rejected. Analogously, a Henze-Zirkler T-test statistic of 1.28 with a p-value of 0.20 indicates that normality is not rejected for the S U R system as a whole. Godfrey's test statistic for serial correlation is 0.48 with a p-value of 0.45 for Saskatchewan anri 1.30 with a p-\~aluc of 0.25 for Alberta, indicating that seri:~l correlation is not present in the residuals of either equation. Additionally. a Chow test for structural change is conducted; the P-value is 0.67 with a pvalue of 0.78. indicating that the null hypothcsis of no structural change as a result of the FSA is not rejected.
A modified Breusch-Pagan test is selectrd to check for ho~noscedasticity of the error terms. White's test is not used because it may identify specification errol-s other than hetet-= oscedasticity beca~ise of its general form (SAS Institute, Inc.). The null hypothesis of the modified Breush-Pagan test is H,,: cr', = tr2(8,, The second method of estimating the effects o f the FSA considers the ratio of Saskatchewan land values to Alberta land values. Figure 1 plots that ratio for thc period 1950-1999, and suggests that the ratio changed around the time the legislation came into effect. If the FSA did not affect Saskatchewan land values, the land value ratio should have remained approximately constant, unless othcr fiictors also changed. As noted above. the primary determinant of land values is rent earned by the land. F i g~~r e 2 shows that the ratio of Saskatchewan to Alberta cash receipts exhibits the same general trend as does the ratio of land values. Ti' the ratio of land values in the two PI-ovinces is considered to be a function of the ratio of cash receipts and the imposition uf land ownership restrictions in Saskatchewan, the following model can be estimated:
where V,S and VP ate the value of land and buildings in Sa\katchewan and Alberta, respectively, R: and K: are the analogous variables for rent, and (, is the error term. To determine Equation (10) is estimated using ordinary least squares. A Durbin-Watson cl-test rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation i n the residuals. Stepwise autoregression indicates that a first-order autorcgrcssive process is an appropriate representation of the error terms. A Q-statistic test rejects thc r~ull hypothesis of homoscedasticity, as does a Lagrange multipliet-(LM) test.
The generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model is one method for addressing heteroscedasticity in time series models. The GARCH model allows long memory processes, which is appropriate in this case sir~ce the Lhl tests for he[-eroscedasticity are significant at long lag lengths. It is possible to combine an AR(nll proces\ with a GARCH(j,,(/) process to mc~del a time series with an autol-egressive error structure involving hctet-oscedasticity. In most cases, a GARCH( I , I ) model is appropriate for estimation: this type of GARCH model combined with an AR(1) model is used in this paper. Estimates are calculated using the method of maximurn likelihood.
Results
Equations (7) and (8). The dunlmy variable representing the FSA is not statistically significant for either Saskatchewan or Alberta, and does not have the expected sign in the Saskatchewan case. The magnitude of the FSA variable is larger for Albcrta than fr)l-Saskatchewan, 3s expected.' Equality of coefficients on that vat.iable for the respective provinces is tested with a Wald test and not rejected, indicating that the effect of the FSA on land values in Sas1;atchewan is not statistically different from that in Alberta.
The coefficient on the dummy variable representing the legislation for the Saskatchewan model is 0.036. Given a mean on the dependent variable (the logarithm of the value of land and buildings) of 13.727 and dividing. the FSA can be interpreted as generating a 0.24% increase in Saskatchewan land values. This translates into an increase of $19.2 million, on the basis of the average value of land and buildings in the province. For Alberta, the coefficient for the FSA is 0.048, which is a 0.33%) increase in the value of land and buildings given a mean dependent variable in Alberta of 14.765. The magnitude of the "effect" of the FSA in Alberta is, therefore, $3 1.9 million-though of course this "effect" cannot be attributed to the FSA, which was not in place in Alberta.
If it were assurned that the value o f land and buildings in Saskatchewan would have Table 3 shows the GARCH model estimates for Equation (10). The null hypothesis presented in Equation ( I l ) is tested and not rejected, indicating that the FSA did not have a statistically significant effect o n the I-atio of Saskatchewan to Alberta land values. As in the SUR model, the expected sign on the dummy is not obtained. In fact. a coefticien~ of 0.042 on the dummy variable representing the FSA implies that the ratio of the value of land and builrlings in Saskatchewan relative to that in Alberta increased rather than decreased as a result of the legislation.
Results of both methods for determining the effects of the FSA on land values in Snskatchewan indicate that the impact of the Iegislation is negligible. N o evidence is f o u n d that the FSA lowered the value of farmland in Saskatchewan relative to the control pro\' '~n c e of Alberta. T h i s rn:iy mean that calls for reamount of land that can be owned by individual non-Saskatchewan residents. Auction theory asserts that such restrictions on asset ownership, which lower the number of competing bidders, should result in decreased prices for the asset. An adaptive-expectations PV model for land PI-ices was developed and estimated for the period 1952-1999 with SUR for the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta, the latter of which was included as a control. A GARCH rnodel, which allows heteroscedasticity to be addressed in a timeseries framework including autoregressive error terms. was used to estimate an equation for the ratio of Saskatchewan to Alberta land values for the period 1950-1 999. Results indicated that the effect of the legislation was not significant, amounting to less than half a rnillion dollars at most for-Saskatchewan.
This study fvund no evidence that the FSA caused land values in Saskatchewan to decrease. As such. there may be little need for its removal. In fact. it could be argued that thc legislation is efticient in the sense that it has not caused econoniic loss while possibly helping to acconiplish the goals of mitigating the possible tax advantages of nonresidents, ensuring good land stewardship, ancl providing a stable environment for local lessees.
The results of this study are subject to some considerable limitations. Better data may have Icd to inore precise results frclni the research. The data for cash receipts and the value of land and buildings are highly aggregated, making the effect of the FSA o n individual land transactions difficult to discover: Additionally. one would desire ;I better measure ol' cash rents to farmers than t h e use o f cash receipts provides, though cash receipts h a v e been used in a Canadian land valuc study b y Veeman, Dong, a n d Veeman and is t h e only reliablt: a p p r o x i m a t i o l~ available. A s well, having only 50 observations in the time series limits the ability to draw strong inferences f r o m the results of the study.
O n e of t h e m o s t important contributions o f t h e paper was its application o f topics f r o m auction t h e o r y into the study of t h e effects o f o w n e r s h i p restrictions o n land values. T h a t a l o w e r n u m b e r of bidders decreases t h c price paid at auction f'or a n asset is well-established empirically. IS transaction-specific d a t a w e r e available. r-r~ore precise results coilld b e o btained. O n e possible a v e n u e of research in this a r e a involves ctildying a specific region of t h e province before a n d after t h e FSA c a m e into effect. However. t h e task of gathe r i n g credible d a t a f o r such research w o u l d b e onerous.
